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THE TWELFTH ROUND: WILL BOXING SAVE 
ITSELF? 
KATHERINE FIGUEROA* 
In 2010, Sergio “Maravilla” Martinez was stripped from his WBC 
middleweight title belt that was then easily handed over to a boxing 
favorite.  In 2015, two big promotional companies, Top Rank Inc. and 
Golden Boy Promotions, filed similar claims against manager and advisor 
Al Haymon accusing him of unfair and anticompetitive business practices.  
These incidents make one long-standing point clear: professional boxing’s 
current structure is an abyss of deception and corruption.  Corruption is not 
only harmful to those intended to be harmed; corruptive practices also 
diminish the quality, creditability, and integrity of the sport. However, 
corruption in the sport of boxing is but a novel issue.  Indeed, deception 
lies at the heart of the sport.  Despite corruption’s persistence, there have 
been many governmental attempts throughout the decades to regulate such 
unlawful conduct.  However, none have had much success in combating 
corruption effectively. 
This Note will begin by giving a brief overview of the history of 
modern boxing and the many failed attempts by the federal government to 
pass laws in an effort to regulate the sport.  It will then analyze current 
legislation, such as the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act and antitrust 
laws, that govern activities in boxing.  Additionally, this Note will analyze 
certain proposals aimed at curtailing corruption.  However, this Note will 
show that lack of enforcement, partiality towards fighters, and inefficiency 
has rendered these measures and proposals superfluous in regulating 
boxing. 
                                                          
*J.D. candidate 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History and Theological 
Studies, 2014, Loyola Marymount University.  I want to thank Professor Cindy Archer for her 
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my place in law school.  I am grateful to my family who without their understanding, love, and 
support throughout the years I would not be where I am today.  I want to extend a special thanks 
to Rob Allison, a former professor and good friend of mine, who incited my interest in boxing 
and kindled my love for argumentation.  Lastly, I want to thank Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 
and its Entertainment Law Review Executive Board for providing a splendid environment and 
opportunity to explore two interests of mine, boxing and the law.    
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Nonetheless, this Note will argue that the best solution to curing 
boxing’s corruptive ills is a private governing body in the form of a league.  
To be effective, a solution must combat corruption on all fronts.  This 
means that all interests of participating parties in the sport of boxing must 
be represented and protected.  This way, corruption will not make its way 
at the expense of the fighter or the promoter.  Moreover, protection of all 
interests will incentivize participants to properly police the sport.  Although 
it is uncontested in boxing literature that a private league is the most 
effective solution, not many have spoken on how such a league would look, 
operate, or combat corruption.  Thus this Note will propose a model that is 
predominantly based on the Professional Golf Association, the PGA of 
America, and in part the National Football League and National Basketball 
League. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sport of boxing is a chasm of corruption in which the law governs 
but enforcement is nonexistent. 
Corruptive practices by those who participate1 in the sport of boxing 
are harmful to those intended to be harmed, as well as to those not intended 
to be harmed, such as the fans and sport in general.  These corruptive 
practices deprive fans of potential matches and faith in their beloved sport.  
Outsiders and potential fans look unfavorably upon the sport and are often 
disgusted by the shady underlying conduct.2  Thus, these corruptive 
practices not only harm individual participants but also diminish the 
quality, credibility, and integrity of the sport as a whole. 
An illustration of corruption’s harmful consequences is the 2010 title 
strip of the World Boxing Council (“WBC”) light middleweight champion, 
Sergio Martinez.3  Sergio “Maravilla” Martinez was an impoverished 
Argentinian boxer who quickly rose to fame and became the lineal light 
middleweight World Boxing Organization (“WBO”) and WBC champion.4  
                                                          
1.  “Participants” or “those who participate” are individuals or companies who in some 
way contribute to the organization of boxing events.  Such individuals include fighters, 
promoters, managers, and sanctioning bodies.  
 
2.  See Michael J. Jurek, Note, Janitor or Savior: The Role of Congress in Professional 
Boxing Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1187 n.7 (2006) (“Years of corruption, manipulation, and 
scandal have tarnished the sport to the point that it is hardly covered by the mainstream media.”). 
 
3.  MARAVILLA (Blue Production Company 2014). 
 
4.  Id.  
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However, after winning the WBC belt, Sebastian Zbik was the WBC 
mandatory challenger.5  HBO, a television network that pays promoters to 
broadcast Martinez’s fights, preferred that Martinez fight someone more 
competitive.6  During Martinez and HBO’s indecision, WBC stripped 
Martinez of his belt and handed it to the mandatory challenger Zbik.7  Zbik 
was required to defend his belt against Julio César Chávez Jr., the son of a 
Mexican boxing legend.8  Later, HBO agreed to air the fight between Zbik 
and Chávez, despite the network’s disinclination to broadcast a fight 
between Martinez and Zbik.9  After defeating Zbik, Chávez became the 
WBC light middleweight champion.10  Because of the ease11 in becoming 
the WBC middleweight champion, many boxing analysts have stated that 
Chávez was nothing but a “paper champion” who was handed a belt due to 
his name and nationality.12 
Although fighters are usually the primary targets of corruption, two 
recent lawsuits demonstrate that even the wealthiest and most influential 
can be victims of deception.  On May 5, 2015, Golden Boy Promotions 
(“Golden Boy”), one of boxing’s biggest promotional companies, along 
with its part owner, Bernard Hopkins, filed a complaint against another 
major figure in professional boxing, Alan Haymon.13  The complaint 
                                                          
5.  Id. 
 
6.  Id. 
 
7.  Id. 
 
8.  Id. 
 
9.  MARAVILLA, supra note 3. 
 
10.  Id. 
 
11.  The ease stems from the mismatch of the fight: Although “Zbik is actually a good 
fighter . . . [he is] not good enough to be a threat and is not necessarily a dangerous opponent.”  




12.  MARAVILLA, supra note 3.  
 
13.  Al Haymon, BOXREC, http://boxrec.com/media/index.php/Al_Haymon 
[http://perma.cc/ME9Y-BMLZ] (“Al Haymon is a so-called adviser, manager, and/or promoter to 
many top boxers in the United States. . . . He is licensed in Nevada as a manager, yet he also 
performs many of the same functions as a promoter.”).  
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describes Haymon’s dominance over the financial aspect of boxing.14  It 
alleges that Haymon engaged in unlawful business practices and criminal 
activities that violated the Muhammad Ali Act, the Sherman Act, and other 
federal and state unfair competition laws.15  On July 1, 2015, another major 
promotional company, Top Rank, Inc., filed its own complaint against 
Haymon and accused him of similar violations.16 
The purpose of this Note is multifold: first, Part II will show that 
corruption is an established facet of modern boxing, taking on different 
forms throughout the decades.  Further, it will show that corruption is a 
problem that government efforts have failed to cure.  Second, Part III of 
this Note will analyze existing laws enacted by legislatures while Part IV 
will analyze different proposals made by scholars that aim to curtail 
corruption, such as the creation of a union or an administrative agency.  
However, as will be shown, partiality towards the fighters’ interests and 
overall lack of enforcement has rendered such measures mere bauble, 
making them ineffective in countering corruption. 
Lastly, in Part V, this Note will argue that a private governing body in 
the form of a league is the best solution to combat corruptive practices.  In 
fact, it is uncontested in boxing literature that the most effective cure to 
corruptive conduct in the sport is the establishment of a private governing 
body.  However, no one has addressed how such a governing body would 
look, function, or combat corruption.17  This Note will propose a model of a 
private league that will effectively combat corruption by attacking it from 
different fronts.  This means that to effectively cure boxing’s corruptive 
ills, the private league will represent and protect the interests of all 
participating parties.  Thus, the proposed private league would provide 
proper oversight of the sport because it would create new rules and laws 
that address emerging issues and help protect and address the interests of 
all participants.  Moreover, not only would the league provide proper 
protection for all parties, it would also be self-enforcing because 
                                                          
14.  See Complaint at *12–17, Golden Boy Promotions LLC v. Alan Haymon, No. 2:15-
cv-03378, 2015 WL 2089683 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2015). 
 
15.  Id. 
 
16.  Complaint at *2, Top Rank, Inc. v. Alan Haymon, No. 2:15-cv-04961, 2015 WL 
4073114 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015). 
 
17.  This author is not aware of, nor did extensive research for this Note to show, any 
jurisprudence articulating how a private governing body would operate to curtail corruption in 
boxing. 
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participants would be incentivized to police themselves in exchange for 
protection. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BOXING, CORRUPTION, AND REGULATION 
A. The Beginning 
Corruption is all but a novel issue in the sport of boxing.  Since the 
time when prizefights in the United States were held in the backrooms of 
taverns, abusive and corruptive practices have penetrated the sport.18  
During the early twentieth century, boxing became extremely popular in 
the United States.19  After many attempts to legitimize boxing, New York 
enacted the Frawley Law in 1911, making it the first state to recognize 
boxing as a legitimate sport.20  Along with legitimization came regulation: 
the Frawley Law created the first state athletic commission.21  Part of the 
law required a “no-decision” declaration for matches that did not end in a 
knockout.22  This requirement was an effort to regulate judges and thereby 
minimize corruption in boxing outcomes.23  But like the many other 
regulatory efforts this Note will discuss, the Frawley Law was ineffective 
as corruption took new forms.  Corruptive practices shifted to news 
reporters: reporters began to declare unofficial outcomes of fights (known 
as newspaper decisions) and people who gambled on the outcomes of such 
fights would agree to bind themselves to decisions of specific reporters.24 
It was not until the 1950s that the federal government first intervened 
in professional boxing.25  During the 1940s and 1950s, organized crime 
held substantial power in the sport.26  After the Department of Justice 
                                                          
18.  See ROBERT G. RODRIGUEZ, THE REGULATION OF BOXING: A HISTORY AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICIES AMONG AMERICAN STATES 25–26 (2009).  
 
19.  CONGRESS AND BOXING: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1960–2003 2 (Edmund P. 
Edmonds & William H. Manz eds., 2005) [hereinafter CONGRESS AND BOXING].  
  
20.  GRAHAM BROOKS ET AL., FRAUD, CORRUPTION AND SPORT 161–62 (2013).  
 
21.  See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 33. 
 
22.  Id. at 34. 
 
23.  See id. at 33–34. 
 
24.  See id. at 34. 
 
25.  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 163. 
 
26.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19.  
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(“DOJ”) launched an investigation into organized crime in boxing, it filed a 
civil antitrust action against the International Boxing Club of New York, 
among others,27 claiming violations of sections one and two of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.28  The district court found for the DOJ, applying the Sherman 
Act to the sport of boxing.  The defendants appealed directly to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.29 
Before the Supreme Court, the government alleged that the 
defendants engaged in interstate trade and commerce when promoting 
professional championship boxing contests.30  The government further 
alleged that the defendants restrained and monopolized “the promotion, 
exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting, and motion picture production and 
distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United 
States.”31  The Court found that professional boxing was subject to antitrust 
laws and, unlike baseball, did not enjoy antitrust exemptions.32  The Court 
held that the government was entitled to pursue its cause of action and 
affirmed the district court’s decision.33 
In the following decades, this Supreme Court decision encouraged 
Congress to monitor boxing more closely.34  Beginning in 1960, Senator 
Estes Kefauver, Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
                                                          
27.  See United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955) (stating 
that the other corporations and individuals named as defendants included the Madison Square 
Garden Corporation, James D. Norris, and Arthur M. Wirtz).  
 
28.  Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. at 237–38 n.2; BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 
163; CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19. 
 
29.  See generally Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236. 
 
30.  Id. at 238–39 (stating that such interstate trade and commerce included (1) negotiating 
contracts with boxers, advertising agencies, referees, judges, announcers, and other personnel 
living in states other than those in which the promoter resides; (2) leasing suitable arenas; (3) 
selling tickets; and (4) arranging other details for boxing contests outside the states in which the 
promoters resided). 
 
31.  Id. at 239–40 (stating that the claim regarding the monopolization of boxing’s trade 
and commerce is based on the conspiracy to exclude competition).  It is claimed that such 
conspiracy began in 1949 with an agreement between the defendant and Joe Louis which, for an 
attractive amount, required Louis to resign his title and exclusive rights to four promising fighters 
he managed.  Additionally, the agreement required Louis to assign exclusive rights to broadcast, 
televise, and film the contests of these fighters to the defendants.  Id. 
 
32.  Id. at 241–45. 
 
33.  Id.; Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1959). 
 
34.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19.  
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Monopoly, commenced a four-year investigation of the sport.35  During a 
hearing in 1961, former heavyweight champion Gene Tunney testified that 
“there is a great tendency for monopoly to develop in the sport, . . . [It] is 
strong, influential, and almost unbreakable.”36  Essentially, Senator 
Kefauver concluded that organized crime did, in fact, control the sport.37  
B. The 1960s: The Decade of Failed Attempts 
The 1960s was a decade permeated with fervent attempts by Congress 
to overhaul professional boxing.  Before his death, Senator Kefauver 
attempted to pass bills that created a Federal Boxing Commission (S. 1474 
and 1182).38  In 1965, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
held multiple hearings regarding six bills that were introduced to the House 
which dealt with the creation of such a commission.39  Senator Kefauver’s 
bills and those that came after enjoyed great support from former boxing 
champions, boxers, sports commissioners, and politicians, among others.40  
Supporters of these bills felt strongly that a federal regulatory commission 
was needed to rescue this great sport from deterioration.41  Unsurprisingly, 
Congress refused to pass any of these bills and instead, largely ignored 
boxing for the next twelve years.42 
                                                          
35.  Id. at 3. 
  
36.  Professional Boxing Part I: Jacob “Jake” LaMotta: Hearings on S. Res. 238 Before 
the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 1418 (1960) 
(statement of Gene Tunney, former American professional boxer).   
 
37.  See CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 8. 
 
38.  Id. at 4–9. 
 
39.  Id. at 10–11.  
 
40.  Professional Boxing Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly 
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 1267 (1961) (testimony of Rocky Marciano); id. at 
1346  (testimony of Melvin Krulewitch); id. at 1405 (testimony of Jack Dempsey); Professional 
Boxing Part 4: Liston-Clay Fight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1761 (1964). 
 
41.  Professional Boxing Part 3, supra note 40 (testimony of Rocky Marciano); id. at 1346 
(testimony of Melvin Krulewitch); id. at 1405 (testimony of Jack Dempsey); Professional Boxing 
Part 4, supra note 40, at 1766. 
 
42.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 12. 
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C. The 1970s, Don King, and Failure 
In 1977, the American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) television 
network joined Don King Productions and created a tournament called the 
United States Boxing Championships.43  Shortly after the formation of this 
tournament, a scandal surfaced that focused national attention on the world 
of boxing: many fighters in the sanctioned fights of the United States 
Boxing Championships had fabricated records.44  Consequently, twelve 
years after the last congressional attempt to federally regulate boxing, a 
House subcommittee held hearings to consider an investigation of the 
United States Boxing Championships.45  Despite the subcommittee’s 
concerns regarding Don King’s questionable business practices and his 
relationship with fighters whose bouts were televised on ABC, Congress 
showed no interest and once more failed to produce a legislative response.46 
Threatened by the return of organized crime into boxing, yet another 
bill was proposed two years later.47  This time, the bill was proposed by the 
House Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce.48  Although a hearing was held in 1979, the 
bill never made it out alive.49  During the 1980s and until 1993, different 
House subcommittees proposed many bills but each suffered the fate of 
their unfortunate predecessors.50 
D. The Turn of the Century: Congress Finally Legislates 
In 1994, Senators John McCain and Richard Bryan sponsored the 
Professional Boxing Safety Act (“PBSA”), which focused on protecting the 
                                                          
43.  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 165. 
 
44.  Id. (stating as an example Ike Fluellen, who was given an honorable mention as the 
“most improved boxer” and claimed two wins in Mexico when, in reality, he had not fought at all 
that year). 
 
45.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 12. 
 
46.  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 165. 
 
47.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 12–13. 
 
48.  Id. 
 
49.  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 166. 
 
50.  Id. at 166–67; CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 13–15. 
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health and safety of boxers.51  Instead, the House received a bill titled the 
Boxing Labor Standards Act, which the 103rd Congress did not pass.52  In 
1995, McCain reintroduced the PBSA while proposing the Boxing, Safety, 
Retirement, and Restraining Act of 1995.53  After almost four decades of 
congressional inaction, the 104th Congress enacted the PBSA.54 
The purpose of the PBSA is: “(1) to improve and expand the system 
of safety precautions that protects the welfare of professional boxers; and 
(2) to assist State boxing commissions to provide proper oversight for the 
professional boxing industry in the United States.”55  To protect boxers’ 
health, the PBSA requires that a physician and an ambulance or medical 
personnel be present during fights56 and that boxers undergo physical 
examinations before every fight in order to prevent injured boxers from 
fighting.57  Unfortunately, loopholes in the PBSA were evident the same 
year of its enactment: these requirements did nothing to protect boxers 
from injury, mainly because the Act depended on fractured enforcement at 
the state-level.58  Although the passage of the PBSA was the first major 
legislation in professional boxing—hence, a significant moment in the 
sport’s history—the PBSA came under great criticism because of its lack of 
enforceability and inability to remedy industry corruption.59  Thus, the 
PBSA’s ineffectiveness further diminished the sport’s credibility.60 
                                                          
51.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 15–16; Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 6302 (1996). 
 
52.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, supra note 19, at 16. 
 
53.  Id. 
 
54.  Id. 
 
55.  Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6302 (1996). 
 
56.  Id. § 6304. 
 
57.  Id. 
 
58.  Antoinette Vacca, Boxing: Why It Should Be Down for the Count, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 
207, 214 (2006). 
 
59.  See Melissa Bell, Time to Give Boxers a Fighting Chance: The Muhammad Ali 
Boxing Reform Act, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 473, 477–78 (2000).  While the 1996 Act 
forbid commissioners from creating deals with promoters, nothing in the act addressed the 
problem of state boxing commission members who served on organizations that state boxing 
commissions regulated.  Additionally, the 1996 Act did not address staged fights in bouts where 
promoters who were interested in a particular result were the parties paying the referees.  Id. 
 
60.  Id. at 478.  
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Senator McCain’s persistence did not stop there.  In 1998, he 
introduced, along with two other bills, the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform 
Act (“Ali Act”), which created amendments to the PBSA.61  The Ali Act 
sought to address some of the PBSA’s shortcomings.62  While the PBSA’s 
central purpose was to protect boxers within the ring,63 the Ali Act aimed to 
protect the rights and welfare of professional boxers by mitigating 
exploitative, oppressive, and unethical business practices outside the ring.64 
More specifically, the Ali Act addressed corruption in the boxing 
industry by remedying contractual abuses65 and conflicts of interest 
between promoters, managers, and fighters.66  Further, the Ali Act sought 
to reduce fixed fights through the regulation of judges, referees,67 and 
sanctioning organizations.68  Despite being a laudable legislative 
accomplishment, the Ali Act proved to be another “failure to launch” 
effort. 
                                                          
61.  The two other bills were the Professional Boxing Safety Act Amendments of 1999, 
which was introduced in the Senate, and the Professional Boxing Integrity Act, which was 
introduced in the House.  However, both of these bills died in Congress while the Ali Act enjoyed 
reports from both Houses of Congress recommending its passage.  CONGRESS AND BOXING, 
supra note 19, at 17–18.  Technically, the Ali Act was reintroduced in 1999 since it was first 
introduced, but not considered, in 1998.  See id. at 18.  
 
62.  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 20, at 167. 
 
63.  Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 421, 421 (2011) (quoting the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)). 
 
64.  Id. (quoting the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)); 145 
Cong. Rec. 28884, 28886 (1999) (stating that the purpose of the Ali Act is “(1) to protect the 
rights and welfare of professional boxers on an interstate basis by preventing certain exploitive 
oppressive and unethical business practices; (2) to assist State boxing commissions in their efforts 
to provide more effective public oversight of the sport; and (3) to promote honorable competition 
in professional boxing and enhance the overall integrity of the industry”). 
 
65.  Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6307(a) (2015) (allowing the American 
Boxing Commission to create contractual guidelines regarding boxing contracts that state 
commissions must follow); id. § 6307(b) (affording protections from coercive contracts). 
 
66.  Id. § 6307(e). 
 
67.  Id. § 6307(f) (forbidding judges and referees from receiving compensation, directly or 
indirectly, in connection with a boxing match until they provide the state commission that is 
regulating such match with a statement of all considerations having to do with said match); id. § 
6307(h) (requiring professional boxing matches to have referees and judges who are certified and 
approved by state commissions). 
 
68.  Id. § 6307(c)–(d).  
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III. THE LAW: DISILLUSIONS NOT SOLUTIONS IN THE MUHAMMAD ALI 
BOXING REFORM ACT AND ANTITRUST LAWS 
This section will introduce current boxing laws and assess their 
enforcement and effectiveness. 
A. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act 
The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act (“Ali Act”) suffers from 
many defects, one of which is that its provisions do not protect boxers as 
much as they provide consequences for promoters.69  Moreover, the Ali Act 
provides minimal financial protection for boxers and ultimately protects top 
contenders more than fighters who need it.70  While the Ali Act does a 
great job in remedying some of boxing’s major problems, a major defect is 
that it lacks proper and realistic enforcement.71  Because the Ali Act does 
not establish a proper system of oversight, enforcement of the Act is 
essentially reserved to the United States Attorney General, individual state 
attorneys, and boxers.72  However, the Attorney General, the Federal Trade 
Commission (the “FTC”), and the chief law enforcement officer of each 
respective State are not obligated to prosecute claims regarding violations 
of the Ali Act.73  Consequently, the Ali Act provides these offices and 
officers with immunity from prosecution and immunity from discharging 
their official duty.74 
From 1996 to 2002, the Attorney General brought no cases under 
federal boxing law and law enforcement agencies made no records of 
referrals.75  From this five-year period of silence, it can be inferred that the 
                                                          
69.  For further reading regarding the defects within specific provisions of the Muhammad 
Ali Act see Cristina E. Groschel, Note, Down for the Count: The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform 
Act and Its Shortcomings, 26 NOVA L. REV. 927, 942–50 (2002). 
 
70.  See id. at 950. 
 
71.  Devin J. Burstein, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems and 
Remedies, Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 433, 459 (2003). 
 
72.  See id. at 461; Professional Boxing Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2015). 
 
73.  See Groschel, supra note 69, at 949–50.  
 
74.  Id. at 949. 
 
75.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-699, COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. AND 
TRANSP., PROFESSIONAL BOXING ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROTECTION OF BOXERS' HEALTH, 
SAFETY, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 5 (2003); John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance 
for Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 23 (2004). 
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DOJ did not and continues not to have a demonstrated interest in 
prosecuting any violations of the Ali Act or other federal boxing laws.  
Further, the DOJ has explicitly stated that violations of such laws are 
misdemeanors that “do not receive significant resources from the DOJ.”76  
Moreover, even if the DOJ did have an interest in boxing, the Attorney 
General is not in the position to oversee the sport and find violations of the 
Ali Act.77  Thus, enforcement is essentially left to the state commissions 
and individual boxers.78 
The next option for enforcement is private civil claims brought by the 
injured party.79  It is unrealistic to expect an individual boxer to sue the 
sanctioning bodies or his respective promoters for violating the Ali Act.80  
For a boxer to bring a cause of action under the Ali Act (or any other law 
that grants him rights or protection), the boxer must know the law exists.81  
The majority of boxers are uneducated and come from sheltered 
backgrounds; thus, many boxers lack awareness of their legal rights and are 
unlikely to exercise them.82 
Assuming that a boxer is aware of his legal rights and decides to sue 
his exploiter, he does so at his own peril.83  Boxers have to worry about 
being blacklisted by promoters or the sanctioning bodies they are suing.84  
Moreover, a boxer must figure out financially how to bring a legal action.85  
Promoters are usually boxers’ only financial source and as such, boxers are 
unable to bring a lawsuit without their promoters financing it.86  
                                                          
76.  McCain, supra note 75, at 23.  
 
77.  Burstein, supra note 71, at 461. 
 
78.  Id. 
 
79.  Id. (exploring the idea of civil suits). 
 
80.  Id. 
 
81.  Id. 
 
82.  Id.; Jeremy Camacho, I Could Have Been a Contender: Arbitration and the Ali Act, 
20 SPORTS LAW. J. 135, 154 (2013). 
 
83.  See Burstein, supra note 71, at 461–62 (discussing issues boxers face if they pursue a 
lawsuit, including the possibility of blacklisting). 
 
84.  Id. 
 
85.  Id. at 462. 
 
86.  Id. 
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Realistically, “[i]t is unlikely that a promoter will hire a lawyer so that a 
fighter can sue him.”87  Therefore, only wealthy premier boxers who have 
the resources to bring a claim are financially capable of actually doing so, 
yet they are not the ones in need of such protection.88 
The average fighter’s only realistic recourse is to turn to the state.89  
However, just like the United States Attorney General, the state is not in 
the position to bring claims under boxing laws.90  If a boxer with enough 
knowledge of the law identifies violations of the Ali Act to the state 
commission, the commission may notify the state attorney general to 
prosecute the claim.91  However, the state attorney general and the state 
commission would likely be unable to enforce the Ali Act without support 
from the federal government because the states that do have commissions 
are usually understaffed and underfunded.92  Moreover, as noted 
previously, the state attorneys’ general and commissions’ records indicate 
an overall lack of interest.93 
In short, although the Ali Act aims to solve many of boxing’s major 
problems, it fails to reform the sport because of its lack of enforcement.94 
B. Antitrust Laws 
For those harmed by corruptive practices, antitrust laws, such as the 
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and state antitrust laws, provide other 
avenues of relief.  Section one of the Sherman Act provides: “Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
                                                          
87.  Id. 
 
88.  See id. 
 
89.  Burstein, supra note 71, at 462. 
 
90.  See id. at 461–62. 
 
91.  Id. at 462. 
 
92.  See id. (stating that some critics have gone much further, arguing that state boxing 
commissions are “jokes, run by small-time politicians interested in free seats facing TV 
cameras”). 
 
93.  Hearing on Reform of the Professional Boxing Industry Before the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci, and  Transp., 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of Gregory P. Sirb) (“The current 
system of letting the various State Attorney Generals [sic] handle these issues has not been 
working.”). 
94.  See Burstein, supra note 71, at 463. 
 
FIGUEROA_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  12:06 PM 
184 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”95  Section two of the Sherman Act 
essentially outlaws monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or 
conspiracies to monopolize.96  A party that violates either of these two 
sections is guilty of a felony.97  Moreover, section 15 of the Clayton Act 
grants the federal courts jurisdiction to “prevent and restrain violations of 
this Act.”98  The Clayton Act allows the attorney general of the DOJ or 
private parties threatened with loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
laws to seek an injunction.99 
A plaintiff may bring a private cause of action against a party who 
violated an antitrust law provision and caused the plaintiff’s antitrust 
injury.100  Accordingly, a harmed boxer or even a promoter may bring such 
an action.  The DOJ is the exclusive federal authority that can enforce the 
Sherman Act and the DOJ shares federal authority with the FTC and other 
agencies to enforce the Clayton Act.101  Additionally, state attorneys 
general hold significant rights under federal and state antitrust laws to make 
enforcement decisions.  State enforcers may bring state law claims as 
supplemental claims in federal law and may make enforcement decisions 
that differ from other state and federal enforcers.102 
However, as noted, most boxers do not have the legal knowledge to 
identify when unlawful conduct has caused them injury and generally do 
not have the means to finance litigation.  Moreover, the DOJ has shown 
                                                          
95.  Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016). 
 
96.  Sherman Antitrust Act § 2; DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE INTRODUCTION 18 (2d ed. 2012). 
 
97.  BRODER, supra note 96. 
 
98.  Id. at 22 (citing The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2016)). 
 
99.  Id. 
 
100.  SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 87–88 (2014) (“All private antitrust plaintiffs must 
have antitrust standing.  Antitrust standing is generally determined by reference to five factors: 
(1) whether the plaintiff’s injury is an antitrust injury; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the 
speculative measure of the harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in 
the apportioning damages. . . . Antitrust injury is an injury to a plaintiff’s business or property 
that is of the type the antitrust laws were meant to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
the challenged conduct unlawful.”). 
 
101.  ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 707 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014). 
 
102.  Id. at 740–41.  
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little interest in investigating the sport.103  Antitrust laws exist and can be 
enforced but, like the Ali Act, there is no one to enforce them. 
IV. OTHER PROPOSALS: IDEALISTICALLY AROUSING, PRACTICALLY 
IMPOSSIBLE 
A privatized national league headed by a Commissioner and national 
governing body is not the only proposed solution to the corruptive ills of 
professional boxing.  Other solutions include unionization of boxers, more 
federal regulation, or a federally governed commission.  Aside from the 
creation of a privatized national league, the remaining proposed solutions 
are impractical and fail to address other forms of corruption present in 
professional boxing besides those affecting boxers’ interests. 
A. Unionization: A One-Sided Solution 
Looking to become champion and net over one million dollars, 
professional boxer Gerald McClellan fought WBC super middleweight 
champion Nigel Benn on February 23, 1995.104  McClellan was knocked 
out in the tenth round and left unconscious when returned to his corner.105  
After losing the fight, McClellan was rushed to the hospital where he 
underwent surgery to save his life.106  As a result of his injuries, McClellan 
suffered multiple strokes and became deaf and blind.107  To pay for his 
medical expenses, McClellan exhausted his assets and became dependent 
on trust fund donations.108 
Although the fight had caused McClellan’s physical injures, it was the 
lack of a sport-wide pension or disability insurance fund to cover medical 
costs that ruined McClellan financially.109  While some professional boxers 
                                                          
103.  This author has not come across any investigation of boxing by the FTC or other 
federal government agency that has granted authority under the Clayton Act to pursue civil 
action. 
 
104.  Arlin R. Crisco, Note, Fighting Outside the Ring: A Labor Alternative to the 
Continued Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1139 (1999). 
 
105.  Id. at 1140.  
 
106.  Id. 
 
107.  Id. at 1139.  
 
108.  Id. 
 
109.  Id. at 1140.  
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make millions during their boxing career, many other “journeymen” 
boxers110 (who either suffer physical tragedies similar to McClellan or 
retire with some chronic ailment because of the sport) are left to fight high 
medical costs with no financial security.111  Indeed, journeyman boxers 
take many risks that subject them to financial ruin and abuse: oftentimes, 
these fighters have no assistance in negotiating contractual terms with 
promoters and managers.112  Further, federal regulations fail to adequately 
address conditions inside the ring and fail to regulate unscrupulous 
promoters and managers.113  Additionally, the lack of uniformity among 
state laws addressing these problems has left fighters with unreliable 
protection.114 
The issues above particularly concern proponents of unionization in 
professional boxing.  Such proponents argue that a union in professional 
boxing would benefit its members by ensuring that the balance of power 
shifts from promoters and sanctioning bodies to boxers.115  Unionized 
boxers would have the power to organize federally protected work 
stoppages, thereby halting the income of the sport’s, promoters, and 
managers until better benefits and working conditions are established.116  
Through the force of collective bargaining, like what is used in professional 
team sports, boxers would be able to bargain for a pension or retirement 
plan, gain more leverage in choosing bouts, improve working conditions, 
and reduce financial exploitation.117 
                                                          
110.  “Journeymen” boxers are those that jump “from promoter to promoter, or manager 
to manager, hoping to get placed as opponents in fights” while making very little money.  They 
are willing to “fight all the time, anywhere, in order to make enough money to get by.”  See 
Health and Safety of Professional Boxing: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and 
Transp., 103d Cong. 70 (1994).  
 
111.  Crisco, supra note 104, at 1140–41.   
 
112.  Id. at 1141. 
 
113.  See id. at 1153–56. 
 
114.  See id. at 1153–55. 
 
115.  Id. at 1175; Devin J. Burstein, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems 
and Remedies, Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 433, 494 (2003). 
 
116.  Crisco, supra note 104, at 1175. 
 
117.  See id. at 1164–65. 
 
FIGUEROA_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  12:06 PM 
2016] THE TWELFTH ROUND 187 
However, the benefits of unionizing boxers are one-sided: although it 
appears that unionization might give a collective voice to many fighters, a 
union would not address issues and interests that do not concern the fighter.  
Unlike the legislative attempts that sought to mitigate abusive and 
corruptive business practices in general and not just practices against 
fighters, a professional boxers union would represent and promote only the 
boxers’ interests.118  Moreover, unionization could be detrimental to the 
sport’s top earners: if the majority of professional boxers (the majority 
being comprised of journeymen fighters) vote to be represented by a union, 
boxers would lose their right to bargain individually.119  Top-prize fighters 
could be limited by a ceiling on purses if, during collective bargaining, 
earning caps are offered in exchange for benefits.120  Thus, unionization is 
an inadequate solution to effectively mitigate the corruptive ills of 
professional boxing because it would only relieve the journeymen boxers 
from unfair and abusive practices while leaving the interests of the 
promoters, managers, and other boxers unprotected. 
Even if unionization protected all parties, the creation of a collective 
labor union among professional boxers is practically impossible.  First, 
boxers have been unable to establish a union because of the sport’s current 
system.121  The boxers who benefit the most and are truly in need of a labor 
union are boxing’s underclass.122  However, these journeymen boxers are 
not in the position to establish a union as they lack the ability and power to 
                                                          
118.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2016) (“The term ‘labor 
organization’ means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation 
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or 
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, 
hours of employment, or conditions of work.”). 
 
119.  Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 421, 450 (2011) (“[I]n sports leagues, unionized players generally engage in 
individual bargaining with teams . . . . ‘[O]nce an exclusive representative has been selected, the 
individual employee is forbidden by federal law from negotiating directly with the employer 
absent the representative’s consent, even though that employee may actually receive less 
compensation under the collective bargain than he or she would through individual 
negotiations.’” (quoting Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1995))).   
120.  Id. 
 
121.  Id. at 449; see Kathy Glasgow, The Fight of Their Lives, MIAMI NEW TIMES (July 
20, 2000), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/the-fight-of-their-lives-6355675 
[http://perma.cc/AA39-HNG3] (stating that in 2000, the Boxer’s Organizing Committee (“BOC”) 
had been attempting to organize boxers for about thirteen years). 
 
122.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 449. 
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do so.123  Notwithstanding the difficulty of organizing thousands of fighters 
across the country, boxers typically work nine-to-five jobs and have little 
time to organize.124  Moreover, because many journeymen boxers have 
humble backgrounds and are vulnerable to promoters, promoters are often 
able to recognize desperate boxers who are willing to fight for a handsome 
wad of cash.125  Further, if a union were to exist, promoters might begin to 
contract non-union fighters to hinder collective organization.126  Fighters 
who decide not to organize with the majority but instead concede to 
promoters’ attractive offers and opportunities would not enjoy the benefits 
and protections that collective bargaining provides.127  In effect, boxers 
would remain unprotected from unfair treatment inside and outside the 
ring. 
Even if unionization protected all parties and even assuming that a 
union was a practical and effective centralized authority, it is still unclear 
whether professional boxers are permitted to unionize under the law.  The 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) provides: “[e]mployees shall have 
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection.”128  As defined in the Act, the term 
“employee” excludes “independent contractors.”129 
To determine whether a worker is an employee, the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”)130 and other courts apply broad common law 
                                                          
123.  Id. 
 
124.  See id. at 450.  
 
125.  Id. at 449. 
 
126.  Id. at 494.  
 
127.  Id. 
 
128.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2015). 
 
129.  Id. § 152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be 
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states 
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in 
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has 
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include . . . 
any individual having the status of an independent contractor . . . .”). 
 
130.  The NLRB is a board created by the NLRA that consists of five members appointed 
by the President of the United States.  The NLRB has the authority to delegate to its regional 
directors its power to “determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to 
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agency principles.131  As the Supreme Court explained, there is “no 
shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, 
but all the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with 
no one factor being decisive.”132  Both the NLRB and reviewing courts 
have refused to construct a specific formula to differentiate between an 
employee and an independent contractor.133  Accordingly, “[r]eviewing 
courts have applied a variety of case-specific factors similar to those listed 
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.”134 
On the one hand, it is argued that professional boxers fall under the 
NLRA’s definition of an employee because promoters control the most 
critical economic elements of fighters’ careers, and fighters perform 
functions essential to the promoter’s operation.135  One of the agency 
factors that courts give much weight to is the “right to control.”136  
Although promoters do not have control over the daily training of fighters, 
promoters do have the power through their exclusive representation 
contracts to limit a boxer’s ability to fight.137  Promoters do so by choosing 
the boxer’s opponents, negotiating the time and place of the bout, and even 
                                                          
investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of representation exists . . 
. .”  Id. § 153. 
 
131.  NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968). 
132.  Id. 
 
133.  Herald Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 430, 433 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 
134.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (providing that “(a) the 
extent of the control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the 
work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the 
kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the 
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the 
particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, 
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the 
person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or 
not the work is part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe 
they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in 
business”); Crisco, supra note 104, at 1169–70.  
 
135.  Crisco, supra note 104, at 1172. 
 
136.  Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Boston, Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, 597–98 (1974) (“The 
right to control the manner of physical performance of the services—as opposed to control over 
the results sought—is generally determinative of employee status, although a number of matters 
of fact must be considered in making that determination.”); Crisco, supra note 104, at 1173. 
137.  Crisco, supra note 104, at 1171–72. 
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requiring the boxer to give up his title if the promoter decides not to 
promote a bout against the mandatory challenger.138 
An additional factor that distinguishes an employee from an 
independent contractor is that employees “do not operate their own 
independent business, but perform functions that are essential parts of the 
company’s normal operations.”139  Despite promotional contracts explicitly 
referring to fighters as independent contractors,140 professional boxers are 
an “essential part” of a promoter’s operations because without the fighter, 
there is no fight to promote.141  If these factors and circumstances are taken 
together, it seems a professional boxer would fall under the NLRA’s 
definition of employee.142  Nevertheless, even if the NLRB and other courts 
recognize professional boxers as employees as defined under the NLRA, 
boxers’ lack of labor law remedies makes the NLRB an inadequate 
recourse for their legal problems.143 
On the other hand, one may argue that professional boxers are 
independent contractors and do not fall under the NLRA’s definition of 
employee.144  In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, the court determined that 
package delivery providers’ single-route drivers were independent 
contractors under the NLRA because FedEx could not “prescribe hours of 
work, whether or when the contractors take breaks, what routes they 
follow, or other details of performance.”145  Promoters, like FedEx, do not 
have such detailed oversight over fighters: promoters do not structure 
fighters’ training, they do not reprimand or discipline fighters, fighters 
choose their own trainers, and fighters are not required to show up to the 
gym every day for work.146 
                                                          
138.  Id. at 1173. 
 
139.  United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. at 259. 
140.  Herald Co., 444 F.2d at 431 (determining that newspaper distributors were 
employees despite being explicitly referred to as independent contractors on contracts). 
 
141.  Crisco, supra note 104, at 1174. 
 
142.  Id. at 1167–75.  
 
143.  See Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 452.  
 
144.  Id. at 451.  
 
145.  FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
146.  See Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 451. 
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A comparable sport to professional boxing is professional golfing 
since both are considered sports with individual athletes.  When compared 
to the argument that boxers are employees of their promoters, professional 
golfers have a stronger argument147 that they are employees of the PGA 
Tour.148  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court determined that professional 
golfers were not employees, but independent contractors.149 
B. Federal Regulatory Agency: The United States Boxing Administration 
Although the PBSA and the Ali Act were foundational pieces of 
legislative reform, they were not designed to cure all existing problems150 
and the issues that they were designed to remedy were not effectively 
addressed.  Therefore, Senator John McCain, sponsor of the PBSA and Ali 
Act, introduced the Professional Boxing Amendments Act (“PBAA”) to 
address the shortcomings and oversights of both the PBSA and the Ali 
Act.151  The PBAA’s central purpose is to create the United States Boxing 
Administration (“USBA”),152 a federal regulatory agency which would 
oversee the sport.  Senator McCain stated: 
 
The primary functions of the USBA would be to protect the 
health, safety, and general interests of boxers.  More 
specifically, the USBA would, among other things: administer 
Federal boxing laws and coordinate with other Federal 
regulatory agencies to ensure that these laws are enforced; 
oversee all professional boxing matches in the United States; 
and work with the boxing industry and local commissions to 
improve the status and standards of the sport.153 
                                                          
147.  Id. at 451–52.  
 
148.  PGA stands for Professional Golfers’ Association.  The PGA Tour is the privatized 
league for professional golfing that organizes the main golfing tours in North America.  See 
generally PGA of America vs. PGA Tour, PGA S. CENT. SECTION ARK. CHAPTER, 
http://arkansaspga.com/2011/09/14/pga-of-america-vs-pga-tour/ [http://perma.cc/9PSX-8CRW]. 
 
149.  See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 697 n.2 (2001). 
150.  John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance for Professional Boxing, 15 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 33 (2004). 
151.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 444. 
 
152.  Also known as the United States Boxing Commission (“USBC”). 
 
153.  148 CONG. REC. S5032-02 (daily ed. June 5, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain). 
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The USBA would belong to the Department of Labor and be headed 
by an administrator experienced in boxing and the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, would appoint him or her.154  One of the 
responsibilities of the USBA would be to administer federal boxing laws 
and work with other federal regulatory agencies to oversee boxing matches 
in the United States, enforce the law, and help improve the status and 
standards of boxing.155  Under section 203(b)(5), an important purpose of 
the USBA is to ensure, through the Attorney General, the FTC, and other 
appropriate officers and agencies of the federal government, “that Federal 
and State laws applicable to professional boxing matches in the United 
States are vigorously, effectively, and fairly enforced.”156 
In essence, the USBA would be able to enforce and strengthen current 
federal laws, discipline violators, and create new regulations protecting the 
interests of boxers.  Further, the USBA would have authority to launch and 
conduct investigations regarding legal violations and, if needed, seek 
injunctive relief in court.157  The USBA would create an additional avenue 
for injured boxers to address the harm they have suffered while avoiding 
costly and time-consuming litigation.158  Under the PBAA, boxers would 
be granted administrative hearings in which the USBA would conduct 
discovery and prosecute claims.159  The USBA would have the authority to 
license boxers, promoters, managers, sanctioning organizations, and 
broadcasters, as well as suspend or revoke such licenses if the USBA finds 
violations of federal boxing laws or if it believes that revocations or 
suspensions serve the public interest.160  Moreover, the USBA would 
maintain a centralized database of medical and statistical information on 
boxers in the United States that would be used confidentially by local 
commissions responsible for licensing decisions.161  The fees charged 
                                                          
154.  Burstein, supra note 115, at 467; McCain, supra note 150, at 30.  
 
155.  McCain, supra note 150, at 30. 
 
156.  Professional Boxing Amendments Act of 2002, S. 2550, 107th Cong. § 203(b)(5) 
(2002). 
 
157.  Id. § 207(b)(1)(A). 
158.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 445. 
 
159.  Id. 
 
160.  McCain, supra note 150, at 30–31. 
 
161.  Id. at 31.  
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would be used to offset a certain percentage of the expenses associated 
with activities of the agency.162 
The Act is by no means flawless and has some troublesome 
requirements.  The PBAA requires that certain contract provisions 
developed by the USBA be included in every contract with a boxer.163  It 
also requires each state boxing commission to review each of these 
contracts to ensure that they comply with the law.164  As one legal scholar 
critiqued, mandatory contract provisions are paternalistic and limit boxers’ 
and promoters’ freedom to contract because a boxer might have to accept a 
contract that does not include certain mandatory provisions in order to get 
his “shot” in the ring.165  While mandatory contract provisions serve to 
protect the boxer’s health, such requirements both limit a boxer’s financial 
opportunities and expose promoters to more risks and costs. 
For a person to arrange, promote, organize, produce, or fight in a 
match, the PBAA requires that the match be approved by the USBA.166  
This provision initially appears to provide extra protection for all fighters 
by having the agency review and approve each match.167  However, a 
match is presumed to be approved by USBA absent one of four 
exceptions.168  One exception requires actual approval when matches 
involve boxers who have “suffered 10 consecutive defeats in professional 
boxing matches; or ha[ve] been knocked out 5 consecutive times in 
professional boxing matches.”169  This means that only matches that 
include the lowest of the blue-collar boxers would be individually reviewed 
and approved under this exception.170  Another exception applies to 
                                                          
162.  Id. 
 
163.  Professional Boxing Amendments Act, S. 84, 110th Cong. § 10(a) (2007). 
 
164.  Id. 
 
165.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 447–48 (“An unheralded boxer might have to accept 
contract terms falling below the federally mandated floor in order to even get his ‘shot’ in the 
ring.  Otherwise, a promoter might decide that signing an unproven prospect is too expensive or 
too risky.”). 
166.  Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a). 
167.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 446. 
 
168.  Id. (citing Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a)). 
 
169.  Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a). 
170.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 446. 
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matches that are “advertised to the public as championship match[es],” or 
matches that involve ten rounds or more,171 which, in practice, would apply 
only to top contenders and premier boxers.172  Thus, it has been pointed out 
that under the USBA approval mandate, only the lowest of blue-collar 
fighters and top contenders are protected, leaving the majority of the boxers 
who fall in between unprotected.173  Consequently, protection of boxers 
through the approval of matches by the USBA is, at most, an empty 
promise. 
Additionally, Senator McCain acknowledged that the USBA would 
not interfere with the daily operations of local boxing and that the agency 
would have to consult with local commissions.174  Senator McCain further 
stated that the administrator would only exercise his power if there was 
reasonable grounds for intervention.175  Accordingly, two government 
agencies would have to agree and work together in order to pass a single 
regulatory measure.  One could only imagine such glorious bureaucratic 
efficiency! 
Further, the USBA might fall victim to its overreaching power.  If the 
USBA is part of the Department of Labor or is its own administrative 
agency itself, the USBA would be governed by administrative law.176  
Congress creates administrative agencies and delegates power to such 
agencies through an organic act, also known as an enabling act.177  Under 
current administrative common law, the USBA would be given great 
deference regarding issues of statutory authority and statutory 
interpretation of its organic act.178  This great deference given to agencies 
would make the USBA vulnerable to overreaching its power.  The 
                                                          
171.  Professional Boxing Amendments Act § 5(a). 
 
172.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 446. 
 
173.  Id. 
 
174.  McCain, supra note 150, at 31. 
 
175.  Id. 
 
176.  JACK M. BEERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 128 
(2011). 
  
177.  Id. 
 
178.  Id. at 127.  See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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difficulty of judicial review of administrative decisions further adds to this 
vulnerability.179 
Further, similar to unionization in that the purpose of the USBA is to 
protect only the boxer’s interests, the USBA would not adequately address 
corruptive practices within boxing in general.  Again, boxing is a sport but 
it has developed into a lucrative business.180  If the USBA’s only authority 
is to regulate boxers’ interests, doing so would be at the expense of the 
business aspect of boxing181 or would otherwise leave the corrupt business 
side of the sport untouched. 
While Senator McCain acknowledges that the PBAA is not the best 
solution, he states that it is a “realistic” one.182  Nevertheless, reality has 
proved otherwise.  Since 2002, the PBAA has been reintroduced to 
Congress each year and each year it has failed.183  The bill consistently 
receives strong opposition and many question whether the creation of such 
an agency would constitute governmental waste.184  Consequently, the 
probability of the PBAA’s enactment is slim to none.185 
V. THE SOLUTION: A PRIVATE GOVERNING BODY 
The proposed solutions discussed earlier have a common purpose: to 
safeguard boxers outside the ring from abusive and unscrupulous business 
practices while protecting their wellbeing inside the ring through the 
creation and enforcement of health-protecting laws.186  However, such 
proposals also share two common deficiencies: partiality and 
ineffectiveness.187  It is not disputed that promoters and managers 
                                                          
179.  See BEERMAN, supra note 176, at 65–144. 
 
180.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 450. 
 
181.  Id. 
 
182.  McCain, supra note 150, at 33. 
 
183.  Ehrlichman, supra note 119, at 444. 
 
184.  Id. at 448–49. 
 
185.  Id. at 449. 
 
186.  See supra Part IV. 
 
187.  See supra Part IV. 
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frequently abuse and exploit boxers.188  It is not contested that fighters are 
inadequately protected inside the ring.189  What these solutions fail to 
recognize is that boxing is not just a sport but also a very lucrative 
business.190  The business side of boxing has made premier boxing possible 
and has created multimillion dollar opportunities for boxers.191  Boxers 
fight, managers protect boxers’ interests,192 promoters make the boxing 
events happen,193 and sanctioning organizations bestow prestige.  A 
solution that only cures the ills affecting boxers is not the solution that will 
“save” boxing from corruption unless advocates of such solutions miss the 
days when all boxing matches took place in the backrooms of taverns and 
where boxers risked their lives for miserable pay.  Therefore, the solution 
that will “save” the sport in all aspects—from loss of quality, creditability, 
and integrity—is one that attacks corruption on all fronts.  It is one that 
protects the interests of all those who participate in the sport of boxing. 
A solution that represents all interests will not only address corruption 
from different aspects effectively, but it will also be self-enforcing.  The 
other solutions discussed above are not necessarily inefficient because they 
fail to address certain major concerns in the sport.  In fact, it can be argued 
that the Ali Act does a great job in addressing some of the issues it intends 
                                                          
188.  Brad Ehrlichman, In This Corner: An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation, 34 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 421, 425 (2011). 
 
189.  Those who advocate for more protection for boxers inside the ring are concerned 
with the majority of boxers, who are journeymen.  These journeymen boxers risk their lives for 
nominal pay and do not have sufficient funds to rectify any medical problems incurred while 
boxing.  Additionally, journeymen boxers are the ones most likely to overlook unfavorable 
contract terms because of their hope of landing a bigger fight and their inability to afford 
independent legal counsel to review and negotiate contract terms.  See Ehrlichman, supra note 
188, at 441–42; see also Michael J. Jurek, Janitor or Savior: The Role of Congress in 
Professional Boxing Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1199 (2006); John McCain & Ken Nahigian, 
A Fighting Chance for Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2004). 
190.  See Jurek, supra note 189.  
 
191.  See Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: The First Jab at 
Establishing Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2260 (2000). 
192.  See Jurek, supra note 189, at 1196; Matt Gerovac, A Fan’s Guide to the Business 
World of Class Boxing, BOXING INSIDER, http://www.boxinginsider.com/columns/fans-guide-
business-world-class-boxing/ [http://perma.cc/UV5M-PRG9]. 
 
193.  Boxing promoters’ only goal is to make money.  It is the promoters who take the 
financial risk because they invest a lot of money in making a boxing event happen by paying for 
advertisements, legal fees, and licensing, among other things.  Therefore, since promoters take 
most of the financial risks, they receive a big portion of the boxer’s purse, any money made from 
network or pay-per-view deals, and venue admissions.  See Gerovac, supra note 192. 
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to cure.194  But the issue of enforcement is a separate one.  Any measure 
whose enforceability relies on the government’s initiative will inevitably 
fail because the government lacks incentive to prosecute violations of the 
law within boxing.195  Those who are in the best financial position to file a 
civil suit against violators are those who either do not need protection or 
are the ones who create the violations.196  Therefore, even if a measure 
grants rights to an injured party to recover, those rights are essentially 
rendered superfluous.197  Other proposals are inadequate because they 
address only issues that are pertinent to fighters.198  Moreover, such 
proposals are, in a sense, impractical.199  For these reasons and many 
others, a centralized governing body in the form of a private league is 
undoubtedly the best solution.  In a private league, all participants and 
major actors will be involved—and therefore their interests represented—
and together will be incentivized to combat corruption by policing the 
sport, enforcing existing law, and creating new regulations that resolve 
emerging issues. 
Despite critics’ hopelessness in the establishment of a private boxing 
league, such a solution is the most promising solution that will help restore 
the sport and cure most of its problems.200  One legal scholar argued: 
“though such an organization would be the change most likely to provide 
real, lasting protection for boxers, it is also the change that is least likely to 
occur, unless promoters could be convinced that their financial interests 
would be best served by joining the organization.”201  Given the recent 
lawsuits by Golden Boy and Top Rank against manager and advisor 
Haymon, it is possible that promoters can be convinced that a private 
centralized governing body may best serve their interest. 
                                                          
194.  See Devin J. Burstein, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act: Its Problems and 
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195.  See id. at 461. 
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197.  See supra Part III. 
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Thus, although the possibility of such a governing body has been 
highly questioned,202 this section will illustrate the feasibility of creating a 
private governing body.  This section will also detail the logistics behind 
how such a governing body would operate. 
A. A Fight Amongst Promoters 
On May 5, 2015, Golden Boy and part owner Bernard Hopkins filed a 
$100 million lawsuit against Alan Haymon and his companies,203 alleging 
that they are attempting to monopolize professional boxing by eliminating 
all competitors.204  Haymon is alleged to have violated the Ali Act, the 
Sherman Act, and other fair competition state laws.205  This lawsuit seeks 
not only monetary damages but also an injunction that would bar “the 
defendants from acting as managers and promoters for boxers, and from 
having a financial interest in the promotions of bouts featuring the boxers 
the plaintiffs manage.”206 
Golden Boy alleges that Haymon “blatantly” ignores the “firewall” 
required by both federal and state law that prevents an individual from 
acting as both manager and promoter.207  Although Haymon denies acting 
like a promoter, he forbids the boxers he manages from signing with any 
promotional company, effectively forcing them to work with one of his 
“sham” promoters.208  Contracts for Haymon’s managerial services include 
provisions that “condition [his companies’] professional services on the 
boxers’ agreement not to contract with legitimate boxing promoters,” 
which according to Golden Boy’s brief is a per se violation of the Sherman 
                                                          
202.  See id.; Burstein, supra note 194, at 496.  
 
203.  Complaint at *2, 33, Golden Boy Promotions LLC v. Haymon, No. 2:15-cv-03378, 
2015 WL 2089683 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2015) (naming as defendants Alan Haymon, Alan Haymon 
Development, Inc., Haymon Sports, LLC, Haymon Boxing Management, Haymon Boxing LLC, 
Haymon Boxing: Media Group Holdings LLC, Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc., Waddell & Reed, 
Inc., Ivy Asset Strategy Fund, WRA Asset Strategy, Ivy Funds VIP Assets Strategy, Ryan 
Caldwell, and Does 1 through 20, all of whom Golden Boy Promotions alleges Haymon operates 
through). 
204.  Id. at *8. 
 
205.  Id. at *2. 
 
206.  See id. 
 
207.  Id. at *1. 
 
208.  Id. at *11. 
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Act.209  Further, the complaint alleges that Haymon already possesses a 
dominant share in the management market and is now using such power to 
dominate the promotional market and monopolize boxing in general.210  
Moreover, Haymon and his companies have not only “acted to cut off 
legitimate promoters [from] . . . promoting boxers he manages, but also 
from essential network television of boxing matches and from the quality 
arenas necessary for the effective presentation of their bouts.”211 
Similarly, Top Rank filed a complaint on July 1, 2015 against the 
same parties for violating the Sherman Act, the Ali Act, and other antitrust 
state laws by unlawfully acting as both manager and promoter and 
engaging in anticompetitive business practices in an effort to monopolize 
the sport.212  Such efforts include “tie out” agreements with boxers that 
prevent such boxers from contacting other promotional companies as a 
condition for receiving managerial services.213  Moreover, the complaint 
alleged that Haymon fraudulently concealed his role as promoter by 
employing “sham” promoters or “frontmen” who were essentially 
controlled by Haymon. 214 
Further, Haymon’s alleged monopolistic practices include venue 
blocking, which is the practice of fraudulently reserving major locations 
and venues for events and then canceling reservations after other 
competitors have been forced to seek other locations.215  Because of 
Haymon’s dominance in the management business, if venues refuse to 
comply with Haymon’s exclusionary demands, they risk being denied 
access to bouts involving top boxers in the industry.216  Moreover, the 
                                                          
209.  Golden Boy Promotions LLC, 2015 WL 2089683, at *12. 
 
210.  Id. at *5. 
 
211.  Id. at *2. 
 
212.  Complaint at *2–3, Top Rank Inc., v. Haymon, No. CV 15-4961-JFW (MRWx), 
2015 WL 9952887 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015). 
 
213.  Id. at *15–16. 
 
214.  Id. at *16–18 (alleging that Haymon’s sham promoters do not have promotional 
contracts with their boxers, a common practice among legitimate promoters.  Moreover, Top 
Rank alleges that Haymon has taken up promoter responsibilities, such as paying boxers’ their 
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216.  Id. at *25. 
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complaint alleges that the defendants have engaged in “payola” practices 
that have been similarly employed by the twentieth century music 
industry.217  Such practices prevent other “promoters from access to 
television broadcasters through exclusive dealing, overbooking, and other 
unlawful means.”218  By buying network time, Haymon is reversing the 
ordinary flow of money between promoter and broadcaster.219  Typically, 
promoters sell broadcast rights to television channels.220  However, by 
purchasing broadcasting time, Haymon is eliminating competition because 
he is paying consumers to take his product.221  Once Haymon has 
eliminated competition, it will be easy for him to recoup his initial loss 
through “supracompetitive pricing.”222  Thus, it is alleged that the 
defendants are “rigging” the boxing industry to control every aspect of the 
sport by acting as promoters, managers, ticket broker, and sponsor for 
almost every professional boxer competing in the United States.223  Top 
Rank claims that this is a loss for both the television broadcasters and 
consumers alike.224  However, Top Rank’s complaint was dismissed based 
on a failure to state damages.225  Nevertheless, Top Rank has decided to 
amend its complaint.226 
Had a private governing body been in place, Haymon and his people 
would not have engaged in the damaging conduct that is the subject of the 
two promotional companies’ complaints.  In other words, the financial 
interests of Golden Boy and Top Rank would have been best served by a 
private governing body because each company would not have wasted 
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money and resources on pursuing a claim in a court of record.  
Furthermore, the two promotional companies would not have suffered the 
damages caused by Haymon’s unlawful conduct since there would have 
been a proper system of oversight and law enforcement that would have 
prevented Haymon from acting unlawfully. 
B. A Private Centralized Governing Body 
The four major sports in the United States—baseball, basketball, 
football, and hockey—are respectively organized in the form of a league 
that handles the day-to-day operations of the sport and provides planning, 
supervision, and control over the enterprise.227  Among other things, these 
leagues operate as centralized governing bodies that provide unified rules 
applicable to any participant of the sport and in the process, monitor the 
welfare of players, franchises, and public confidence in the sport.228  
Moreover, these organizations enforce their rules and regulations by 
imposing penalties such as fines, bans, and suspensions.229  Noncompliance 
with imposed penalties will prevent the person from participating in the 
sport.230 
A private league is the most effective solution to combat many forms 
of corruption as exemplified by major professional team sports leagues, 
such as the National Football League (“NFL”).  Unlike boxing, the NFL is 
a team sports league, but like boxing, football was tainted by deceptive 
practices.231  In 1920, fourteen football team owners made a deal to save 
professional football by creating a professional football league.232  Football 
team owners were losing money because of “soaring player salaries and 
intense bidding wars” that poached players from other teams.233  
                                                          
227.  See Baglio, supra note 191, at 2264 (quoting PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR 
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228.  Id. at 2265. 
 
229.  Id. 
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Accordingly, the purpose of this new venture was to “raise the standard of 
professional football in every way possible, to eliminate bidding for players 
between rival clubs and to secure the cooperation in the formation of 
schedule.”234  In other words, the league was created to protect the interests 
of the owners. 
Decades later, the NFL created the office of the commissioner.235  
During the 1960s, the league expanded the power of the commissioner with 
the election of the third commissioner of the NFL, Pete Rozelle.236  
Essentially, the owners gave Rozelle “full, complete, and final jurisdiction 
and authority over any dispute involving a member or members in the 
League.”237  The commissioner’s discretion has further widened today 
because he now has the power to punish a player for conduct that he 
considers “detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game 
of professional football.”238  However, the commissioner’s power is limited 
in that he must answer to the owners because they hold the power to 
remove him.239 
The NFL also consists of a Competition Committee (the 
“Committee”) which approves any change in game rules, league policy, 
club ownership, or other modification to the game.240  Essentially, the 
Committee leads the rule-making process.241  When deciding what 
regulatory modifications to make, other interests are represented and heard 
because the Committee receives input from its coaches’ and general 
managers’ subcommittees, experts, clubs, players, league committees, the 
                                                          
234.  Id. 
 




236.  Id. 
 




238.  Id. 
 
239.  League Governance, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, 
http://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/league-governance/ [http://perma.cc/RX3M-37XS]. 
 
240.  Id. 
 




FIGUEROA_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  12:06 PM 
2016] THE TWELFTH ROUND 203 
NFL Players Association, and others sources.242  Afterwards, the 
Committee holds a national meeting to discuss the feedback it received, 
among other things, and reviews information with league medical advisors, 
members of the coaches’ and general managers’ subcommittees and NFL 
Players Association representatives.243  After further review at the annual 
meeting, the Committee presents a report of its findings to all owners, who 
then vote on any proposed rules or rule changes.244  Adoptions of a new 
rule or a revision of an existing rule must have the support of seventy-five 
percent of the owners.245 
The players’ interests are further represented through the National 
Football League Player’s Association (“NFLPA”).  The NFLPA represents 
players’ financial interests by playing a key role in renewing of collective 
bargaining agreements, among other things.246  It provides insight and 
feedback to the Committee regarding player protection during the rule-
making process.247 
Additionally, the league has created regulations that protect the 
owners’ interests, such as “the salary cap,” which promotes fair 
competition by limiting the amount each team can spend on player’s 
salaries.248  Further, the Commissioner may protect the owners’ interests 
and those of the sport by exercising his power to discipline “an owner, 
shareholder, partner or holder of an interest in a member club . . . [who] has 
either violate[d] the Constitution and Bylaws of the League or professional 
football.”249  Moreover, bargaining with the NFLPA has granted discretion 
to the league’s Commissioner by allowing him to punish conduct, including 
criminal conduct, that affects “the integrity of, or public confidence in, the 
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game of professional football.”250  This broad discretion is premised on two 
justifications: the conduct’s harm to the sport’s image and profitability.251  
These reasons explain why the Commissioner had the power to discipline 
Michael Vick for his involvement in dogfighting and gambling252 and his 
power to discipline Tom Brady for his involvement in the “Deflategate” 
scandal.253  However, the Deflategate scandal has placed limits on the 
Commissioner’s unfettered discretion.  After Brady and his employer 
challenged the commissioner’s ruling, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Minnesota vacated the ruling, thereby calling into question the 
commissioner’s partiality.254 
While a centralized governing body such as a sports league seems to 
be the best solution for the corruptive ills of boxing since it has been 
proven effective in major professional team sports leagues,255 not much has 
been discussed as to how such a body will operate and be structured.  The 
sole purpose of having a governing body in boxing would be to manage the 
sport: create rules and regulations, enforce these rules and regulations along 
with existing law, and impose penalties if ignored.  To effectively combat 
corruption, the structure of such a private league must contain a balance of 
powers, meaning that the interests of all participating parties must be 
represented and heard.  Therefore, because the sole purpose in creating a 
centralized governing body would be to manage the sport, enforcement 
would most likely not be overlooked and fair practices and treatment would 
be assured.256  Moreover, because a private league will have a structure that 
represents and protects the interests of all parties, the league will be self-
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enforcing since it will incentivize those involved to properly oversee the 
sport. 
Indeed, it is true that boxing is different from other major sports in the 
United States in that it is not a team sport;257 however, the fact that boxing 
is not a team sport does not warrant complete dismissal of adapting certain 
aspects of such team sports’ organizational structures.258  Nevertheless, 
because boxing is an individual sport like golf, the Professional Golfers’ 
Association of America (“PGA”) may serve as a better organizational 
model.259  Thus, to achieve the primary purpose mentioned above, the sport 
of boxing could adopt the PGA’s organizational structure as well as aspects 
of team sports’ structure provided that the structure adequately addresses 
the needs and interests of all participants. 
1. The Mechanics and Templates 
As a template, those in the sport of boxing may choose from two 
structures: the PGA Tour or the PGA of America.260  The PGA Tour’s 
structure consists of a board called the Player Advisory Council (“PAC”), 
directors known as the Policy Board, and the Commissioner.261  The Policy 
Board’s responsibility is to govern and control the sport262 by promulgating 
rules, regulations, and penalties it deems in the best interests of the sport.263  
                                                          
257.  See id. at 494–95. 
 
258.  See generally id. at 494. 
 
259.  Id. at 495.  
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The Policy Board consists of four player directors serving three-year terms, 
one PGA of America director, and four volunteer independent directors 
who are among the nation’s leading businessmen.264  Professional golfers 
who play in fifteen or more regular PGA Tour events in a year have voting 
rights to elect the player directors.265  However, the candidates that 
professional golfers may vote for come from a slate of candidates chosen 
by the existing player directors.266  Preceding independent directors elect 
the succeeding independent directors.267 
The PAC consists of sixteen members, each serving a one-year 
term.268  Eight of the sixteen PAC members are appointed by the player 
directors from the Policy Board and the remaining eight are elected by vote 
of the general membership.269  The PAC “works with, advises, and consults 
the PGA Tour Policy Board and commissioner Tim Finchem on various 
issues facing the PGA Tour and its membership.”270  Because of the role 
the PAC plays, the fact that members of the PGA Tour are able to vote in 
PAC members, combined with the absence of a players’ union, means that 
players must solely rely on the PAC as well as the Policy Board to 
represent their interests on issues with the Commissioner and his staff.271 




264.  Id. 
 
265.  Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D. Or. 1998).   
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Tournament Regulations, supra note 262, at 163–65. 
 
267.  See Tim Rosaforte, What’s Behind the PGA Tour Policy Board, GOLF DIGEST, 
http://www.golfdigest.com/story/gw20080201rosaforte [http://perma.cc/HD4F-62FZ].  See 
generally AT&T CEO to Join PGA Tour Policy Board, GOLF CHANNEL (Dec. 8, 2011, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.golfchannel.com/news/golftalkcentral/att-ceo-join-pga-tour-policy-board/ 1/3 
[http://perma.cc/HD4F-62FZ]. 




269.  Id. 
 
270.  Id. 
 
271.  Rosaforte, supra note 267. 
 
FIGUEROA_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  12:06 PM 
2016] THE TWELFTH ROUND 207 
The Commissioner’s responsibility is to interpret and apply the 
regulations set forth by the Policy Board: “[h]is job is to hire a staff and 
make sure the directives of the [Policy] [B]oard are followed.”272  A search 
committee made up of the Policy Board’s independent directors elects the 
Commissioner.273  Any complaint regarding the violation of rules or 
regulations are first filed with the PAC.274  If the PAC decides that the 
complaints are important enough, they are discussed and ultimately passed 
on to the Policy Board.275 
The Chief of Operations, who is part of the Commissioner’s office, 
presents a notice to the member who is the subject of the complaint unless 
the notice is of a proposed major penalty (in which case the Commissioner 
executes it).276  The member must then submit a proposed disciplinary 
action, penalty facts, or evidence of mitigating circumstances that may 
apply to the Commissioner within fourteen days of such notice.277  Within 
fourteen days of receiving the information from the member, the 
“Commissioner shall notify the member in writing of the imposition of the 
proposed disciplinary action or penalty, or that the proposed action has 
been dismissed.”278  After the imposition of either a disciplinary action or 
penalty, the member may appeal to the Appeals Committee, which consists 
of non-player directors designated by the Policy Board.279 
The PGA of America has a different and simpler organizational and 
disciplinary structure.  The structure consists of a board of directors, a 
board of control, and a board of inquiry.280  In the PGA of America, 
complaints are filed with the Board of Inquiry, who then could further 
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276.  2015–2016 PGA Tour: Player Handbook & Tournament Regulations, supra note 
263, at 150. 
 
277.  Id. 
 
278.  Id. at 151.  
 
279.  Id. 
 
280.  The PGA of America does elect executive officers; however, for the purposes of this 
section, executive officers are not relevant.  
 
FIGUEROA_FINALX2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  12:06 PM 
208 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
investigate the issue and report it to the Board of Control.281  The Board of 
Control consists of the Secretary of the Association and four members of 
the association appointed by the President according to geography.282  The 
Board of Control may hear complaints filed with the association and 
appeals from any other decisions made by the association.283 
The Board of Directors consists of three officers: the President, a 
Player Director elected by the Player Directors of the PGA Tour, Directors 
representing each of the Association’s Districts, and two Independent 
Directors.284  The Board of Directors, like the Policy Board of the PGA 
Tour, is responsible for the promulgation of rules, policies, and regulation 
of the association and its members.285  However, unlike the Policy Board 
but like the Commissioner of the PGA Tour, the Board of Directors is 
responsible for the management of the association and has the power to 
interpret its rules, regulations, policies, and even the constitution and 
bylaws of the association.286  Moreover, the Board of Directors “has the 
jurisdiction to hear appeals that arise from decisions of the Board of 
Control.”287  Decisions by the Board of Directors are final.288 
2. Proposed Models 
Given that boxing is not organized in the exact same way as golf, the 
sport of boxing should adopt a variation of the two PGA structures.  
Similarly, because boxing is not a team sport, a league structure suitable for 
boxing should not be identical to the private leagues of professional team 
sports.289  Moreover, to avoid doubts regarding partiality, boxing should 
                                                          
281.  Constitution Bylaws and Regulations, THE PROFESSIONAL GOLFER’S ASSOCIATION 
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not strictly adhere to the NFL’s structure.290  Additionally, although it was 
mentioned that the “best of all possible worlds would have” both a central 
governing body and a union,291 unions have proven to be at times 
ineffective and harmful to some sports and their fans, sometimes causing 
lockouts and work stoppages in the NBA, MLB, and NFL.292 
Despite boxing’s lack of boxer organization, boxers’ interests may 
still be represented in a centralized governing body through the adaptation 
of a player council (the “Council”) similar to the PAC of the PGA Tour.  
Should such a structure be adopted, the boxers participating in the 
association should have voting rights that would allow them to elect the 
Council’s members.  Therefore, the Council will serve to work in the best 
interests of the fighters.  Moreover, unlike the PAC in the PGA Tour, the 
Council should be allowed to choose some of its members from among the 
association’s general membership.  This way, the concerns of all members 
are adequately heard and the voices of journeymen boxers are not 
overshadowed by the voices of premiere boxers. 
Additionally, boxing should adopt a board of directors who, like both 
the PGA of America’s Board of Directors and the PGA Tour’s Policy 
Board, promulgates rules, regulations, and penalties it deems in the best 
interests of the sport.  Boxing can strictly follow the same structure as the 
PGA Tour by allowing the board of directors to consist of player directors 
who are elected by premier boxers.  The remaining board members could 
be independent directors, as in the PGA Tour.  However, to adequately 
address the interests of all participants of the sport, some of the board 
members should be elected by managers and promoters, who will be 
members of the association as well.  Thus, the board of directors would be 
comprised of members that represent the interests of boxers, managers, and 
promoters when promulgating and enforcing regulations. 
With respect to disciplinary authority, it could either be conferred to a 
commissioner, like the PGA Tour, or to a board of control, like the PGA of 
America.  If the former option is adopted, boxers can appeal to a committee 
to review the decisions of the board of directors or to an outside arbitrator, 
                                                          
290.  See supra Part V.B. 
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like in the NBA.293  However, for a more fair and disinterested decision, an 
outside arbitrator would be the better of the two options unless the appeals 
committee is comprised of disinterested officers.  If instead a board of 
control is given disciplinary authority, jurisdiction to hear appeals should 
then be conferred to either the board of directors, an appeals committee, or 
neutral third party arbitration while possibly including a board of inquiries 
for investigatory purposes.  To prevent a “floodgate” effect, like in the 
PGA of America and the NBA, formal complaints should only be filed if 
probable cause exists.  Like the NBA, the standard of review for appeals 
should be the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.294 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Deceptive and corruptive practices are harmful not only to their 
intended targets but also to innocent bystanders.  Corruption, whether it be 
in an attempt to monopolize the sport or circumvent health and safety 
protections for boxers, hurts the interests of boxers, promoters, managers, 
as well as boxing fans and the sport in general.  If a manager limits his 
fighters’ choice of promoter, as in the two cases brought against Haymon, 
the manager is interfering with fair competition while at the same time 
depriving the fighter of promotional and financial opportunities.  Moreover, 
the manager is possibly preventing the anticipated matches from occurring. 
Additionally, bringing a lawsuit and going to trial is expensive.  Court 
fees, witness expenses, and attorney’s fees, among other things, make up 
the cost.  Thus, it is safe to say that both the Golden Boy and Top Rank 
lawsuits against Haymon have not been cheap and the trial expenses will be 
hefty.  This is money that is not only taken away from wealthy promoters 
but also from future investments in boxing.  Moreover, if the remainder of 
allegations set forth in both complaints are true, boxing fans, promoters, 
managers, and boxers have all been deprived of boxing opportunities and 
matches.  In short, if Haymon had engaged in venue blocking, used the 
music industry’s “payola” practices, and included tie-out provisions in 
contracts, he prevented matches involving other promoters from occurring 
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and deprived boxers from opportunities and fans from enjoying potential 
matches. 
A private governing body like the one this Note proposes would 
mitigate the unfair practices and corruptive ills that penetrate the sport of 
boxing.295  Such a private league would be unlike the solutions proposed by 
other legal scholars.296  This private governing body would effectively deal 
with corruption by combating it on all fronts, having the enforcement 
power that the Ali Act lacks, and existing as a proper policing and 
oversight system that disciplines behavior before it creates harm.297  The 
representation of every league participant’s interest in the league’s internal 
structure and regulations would serve as an incentive to ensure that all 
aspects of corruptive conduct are properly dealt with, prevented, or 
redressed.298  The governing body would be an avenue where injured 
parties could redress the harm they have suffered.299  Moreover, the 
governing body would continuously promulgate rules and laws that deal 
with emerging issues and new forms of corruption.300 
In acting in the best interests of all participants and the sport, if such a 
private league had been in place during the occurrence of these allegations 
against Haymon, the private league would have either prevented such 
conduct from reoccurring or mitigated the harm that flowed from such 
conduct.  As mentioned, three months after Top Rank filed their complaint, 
the court dismissed it for failure to state damages.  The answer to whether 
Top Rank did in fact sustain damages from Haymon’s conduct, however, 
would not have impeded a private league from pursuing disciplinary action 
and ceasing Haymon’s practices.  If a private league were in place, Top 
Rank would not need to amend its complaint for failure to state damages.  
The damages were clear: Haymon’s conduct robbed boxers, managers, 
promoters, and fans from potential bouts and it further tarnished the 
quality, creditability, and integrity of the sport. 
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